We provide an epistemic foundation for cooperative games by proof theory via studying the knowledge for players unanimously accepting only core payoffs. We first transform each cooperative game into a decision problem where a player can accept or reject any payoff vector offered to her based on her knowledge about available cooperation. Then we use a modified KD-system in epistemic logic, which can be regarded as a counterpart of the model for non-cooperative games in Bonanno [7] , [10] , to describe a player's knowledge, decision-making criterion, and reasoning process; especially, a formula called C-acceptability is defined to capture the criterion for accepting a core payoff vector. Within this syntactical framework, we characterize the core of a cooperative game in terms of players' knowledge. Based on that result, we discuss an epistemic inconsistency behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem, that is, the increase of the number of replicas has invariant requirement on each participant's knowledge from the aspect of competitive market, while requires unbounded epistemic ability players from the aspect of cooperative game.
Introduction
So far, research on epistemic aspect of game theory focuses on non-cooperative games (Perea [34] , Dekel and Siniscalchi [17] , Bonanno [7] , [10] ), while for cooperatie games, it is yet to flourish. The reason, in my opinion, lies in the role of players. In a non-cooperative game, the relationship between players' choices and the payoffs is specified; a player's payoff depends on her own choice as well as others', hence she has to consider about the situation as well as the choice and knowledge/belief of the opponents. In contrast, the relationship is obscure in cooperative games.
To be specific, let us have a closer look at the framework of cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory has two components: the description of a game situation and solution concepts. A game situation is described as a pair (N, v) , where N is the set of players, and v is the characteristic function which assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a real number as its payoff which can be achieved by collective activities of players in that coalition. 1 Nevertheless, it is not clear what kind of choices is allowed to be taken by each player and how the payoff of a coalition is determined by their choices. 2 A a solution concept is a set of payoff vectors satisfying some specified conditions. Though those conditions are usually intended to capture concepts concerning distribution justice, like equality or fairness. Yet there is no explicit connection between those conditions and each player's decision-making.
Therefore, if we take cooperative game theory as a passive discipline rather than a normative one and anticipate to analyze coalitional behavior as intended by its founders von Neumann and Morgenstern [48] , it is necessary to provide an initiative role for each player. In the literature, this problem is solved by implementing a cooperative game with a competitive market (Wilson [49] , Vohra [47] , Dutta and Vohra [18] , Myerson [30] ), a matching (Roth [38] , Chade [12] , Liu et. al. [28] , Pometto [36] ), or a non-cooperative game (i.e., the Nash program initiated by Nash [31] . See Serrano [41] ). In each case, since the solution of the cooperative game coincides with the corresponding implementing model, studying the epistemic structure of the latter provides fascinating insights into that of the former. Yet it has a problem. Since there is no formal relationship between a cooperative game and its implementing models in general other than the coincidence of their outcomes, when there are multiple models, it is difficult to determine which is better and consequently whose epistemic structure is more "suitable" as a foundation of the cooperative game. Further, even if the implementing model is unique, it still has to argue in what sense its epistemic structure can also be regarded as that of the cooperative game.
Nevertheless, the essential logic behind the implementation approach is right. To provide an initiative role for each player, we need specify a context for a cooperative game. In this paper, we propose a simpler (if not naive) and more general approach. We first transform a cooperative game into a decision problem by asking each player whether she would accept a payoff vector. Then we use a modified KD-system in epistemic logic, which can be regarded as a counterpart of the model for noncooperative games in Bonanno [7] , [10] , to describe a player's knowledge, decisionmaking criterion, and reasoning process for answering that question. Within this framework, we characterize the epistemic structure of the core, one of the most famous solution concept, in terms of players' knowledge. The basic idea is illustrated as follows. Example 1.1 (A cooperative game as a decision problem). Consider a 2-person game (N, v) where v({1}) = v({2}) = 10 and v({1, 2}) = 30. The core of this game is {(x, 30−x) : 10 ≤ x ≤ 20}. We take player 1's viewpoint and consider a payoff vector (9, 21) . To reject it, player 1 has to know the highest payoff she can guarantee by herself, i.e., v({1}). For another payoff vector (10, 10) , player 1 needs to know the highest payoff she can guarantee by cooperating with player 2, i.e., v({1, 2}). Actually, it can be seen that for unanimously accepting only core payoffs, i.e., each payoff in the core being accepted by both players and each payoff outside the core being rejected by at 1 To be accurate, v(S) is a real number only in TU games, i.e., a game with side payment and transferable utility. In NTU game, i.e., a game not satisfying the two conditions, v(S) is a ser of payoff vectors. In this paper we focus on TU games. 2 The original intented meaning of v(S) (S ⊆ N ) of von Neuman and Morgenstern [48] is the highest sum of payoffs of players in S that can be guaranteed. In literatures of market games (e.g., Debreu and Scarf [16] , Shapley and Shubik [45] , Crawford and Knoer [14] ), v(S) is the highest surplus that can be achieved by exchange among players in S. However, in general v(S) only means Pareto frontier (for TU games) or feasible payoffs (for NTU games) without specification of its members' choices. least one player, each player i needs to know v({i}), and at least one player has to know v({1, 2}).
In this paper, we generalize the above discussion. We first define a formula called C-acceptability to capture the decision criterion corresponding to the core, and explore how much knowledge is needed for players with C-acceptability as their criterion to accept unanimously a payoff vector if and only if it belongs to the core. Our main result states that unanimous acceptance of only core payoffs requires and only requires the each coalition's highest achievable payoff is known to at least one member of it.
This result provides a new perspective on some classical theorems in the literature, for example, the theorem shown by Debreu and Scarf [16] stating that as the number of replicas of players in a market increases unboundedly, the cores converge to competitive equilibrium. Through an example, we will show that, as the number of players increases, to accept unanimously only the core payoffs requires at least one player's knowledge to grow accordingly; consequently, in the limit some player's knowledge should be unbounded. On the other hand, it has long been noticed that the epistemic requirement for a competitive equilibrium is rather limited (Hayek [23] , Bowles et al. [6] ), and the increase of the number of replicas does not change the required knowledge for each player. This shows an epistemic inconsistency behind the mathematical convergence, which may advance our understanding of the market price as a mechanism succinctly integrating complicated information and coordinating people's behavior.
Transforming a cooperative game into an accept-or-reject decision problem at the individual level is neither artificial nor unfamiliar in the literature. Cooperative game theory studies socially just allocation among players given their contributions described by the payoffs of coalitions. In political philosophy and social welfare theory, a necessary condition for social justice is the agreement upon it by fully rational individuals (Rawls [37] . See Freeman [20] ). Actually, this approach has long been exploited without any further discussion. One famous example is the accept-or-reject process developed by Gale and Shapley [21] as an algorithm for calculating a stable matching.
To transform a cooperative game into a decision problem does not mean to implement it with a non-cooperative game. In our model, we did not specify the payoff rule corresponding to each profile of answers. Our intention is to develop a general framework, which is able to induce various non-cooperative models. In Section 5.2, we will give some further discussion.
Epistemic logic has long been used in investigating epistemic aspect of non-cooperative games (Fagin et al [19] , Bonanno [10] ). While most research is done by semantics, 3 there is also a group of researches using syntactic approach (e.g., Bonanno [7] , [10] , Kaneko [24] , Kaneko and Suzuki [25] ). Semantics is relatively easier to deal with, and semantic and syntactic approaches are basically equivalent with respect to the provable/valid propositions. Here we adopt syntactic approach partly because it describes an individual's reasoning process explicitly: what is one's beliefs/knowledge, what is one's inference rule, and along what kind of reasoning process one reaches the conclusion. This also helps to study computational and descriptional complexity of epistemic structures. Another reason is that we do not require interpersonal inference, i.e., i believes that j believes ..., which is more convenient to be treated by semantic approach. Since our focus is how much knowledge is needed, we only require that each player has basic inference ability (i.e., Modus Ponens) and has consistent belief. Hence we adopt the weaker system KD.
The hierarchy of interpersonal inference can also be discussed in our framework, which depends on what kind of decision-making criterion a player adopts. In Section 5.2, we also discuss briefly some alternative criteria where a player's acceptance/rejection of a payoff vector depends on her belief on others' beliefs and others' beliefs on others' beliefs, and so on.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to cooperative game theory and sequent calculus (a Gentzen-style proof calculus system). Section 3 formulates a player's decision-making process in a decision problem transformed from a cooperative game. There we define C-acceptability as the decision criterion corresponding to the core. Based on it, we show the main result. Section 4 discusses the epistemic inconsistency behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries

Cooperative games and the core
In this subsection we give a survey of concepts about cooperative games with side payment and transferable utility (abbreviated as TU game) and the core. For details, see Kannai [26] and Peleg and Sudhoelter [33] . A TU game is a pair G = (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is the set of players and v : 2 N → R with v(∅) = 0 is the characteristic function. For each coalition S ⊆ N, v(S) is interpreted as the payoff achievable by collective activities of players in S. Given a TU game G = (N, v), a payoff vector of G is an element x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ R N which is interpreted as an allocation plan where each player i ∈ N receives payoff x i . Cooperative game theory studies payoffs satisfying various conditions, called solution concepts. One of the most important solution concept is the core. Definition 2.1 (Core). Let G = (N, v) . The core of G, denoted by C(G), is the set of all payoff vectors x = (x i ) i∈N of G satisfying the following two conditions:
Each payoff vector belonging to C(G) is called a core-payoff vector. Pareto-optimality means that x should be feasible through the cooperation of all players in N. Coalitional rationality means that no coalition can block x and achieve a higher payoff by cooperation among its members. Therefore, coalition rationality can be alternatively defined by the unblockability of any coalition as follows. Let x, y ∈ R N be payoff vectors of G and S ⊆ N. We say that y dominates x via S, denoted by y dom S x, iff the following conditions hold:
It can be seen that C(G) = {x ∈ R N : Σ i∈N x i ≤ v(N ) and there is no S ⊆ N and y ∈ R N with Σ i∈N y i ≤ v(S) such that y dom S x}.
Due to the finitistic character of the formal language, in this paper we focus on those x ∈ C(G) such that x i ∈ N for each i ∈ N, though in Section 4 we will extend the discussion into rational numbers under some restrictions. Here, we need the following lemma.
, then there is some S ⊆ N and y ∈ R N satisfying the following three conditions:
Proof. Since Σ i∈N x i ≤ v(N ) and x / ∈ C(G), there exists some S ⊆ N such that Σ i∈S x i < v(S). Since v(S) ∈ N, it follows that v(S) − Σ i∈S x i ≥ 1. We define y ∈ R N as follows: for each i ∈ N,
We show that y defined in (1) satisfies conditions (a)-(c).
(c) holds by construction. // Not every TU game has a non-empty core. The theorem of Bondareva [11] and Shapley [42] characterizes the non-emptiness of the core in terms of balancedness. We will discuss the relationship between Bandareva-Shapley Theorem and our results in Section 5.1.
Epistemic logic and its application in cooperative games
In this subsection we give a brief survey for epistemic logic. A logic has three components: the alphabet (symbols), words (formulae), and grammar (axiomatic schemata and inference rules). We adopt sequent calculus, a Gentzen-style proof calculus system, since it is convenient for analyzing reasoning structure. For a thorough introduction, see Blackburn et al. [5] , Kaneko and Suzuki [25] , and Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [46] . We also show how to use epistemic logic to describe a cooperative game.
We start from the following symbols. We use At to denote the set of atomic formulae and P the set of all formulae. A formulae is called non-epistemic iff it contains no belief operator. Now we consider how to describe a player's epistemic situation in a TU game. Let G = (N, v) with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N and M ∈ N be an upper bound of all payments, i.e., v(S) << M for each S ⊆ N. 5 We define the set of atomic formulae At = At 1 ∪ At 2 , where
At can be seen as the counterpart of the atomic formulae in epistemic logic for non-cooperative games (Bonanno [7] , [10] ). The interpretation of each x S ∈ At 1 is that "payoff vector x can be obtained through some collective activity of players in S", and that of y T ≥ S x U in At 1 is "inside coalition S, each player's payoff at y is no less than at x". It should noted that the interpretation of y T ≥ S x U is different from y dom S x, for the former does not require that y i > x i for some i ∈ S, which is required in the latter. In the following, when S = {i} for some i ∈ N, we abbreviate y S and y T ≥ S x U to y i and y T ≥ i x U , respectively. Also, we use y T > S x U as an abbreviation of the formula
It should be noticed that N <ω contains the null sequence , i.e., the sequence with length 0, which is obtained by letting m = 0. For each e = (i 1 , ..., i m ) ∈ N <ω , we use B e (A) as an abbreviation of
We abbreviate (i) • e and e • (i) to i • e and e • i, respectively. Now we define the sequent calculus of the epistemic logic. First, we introduce a concept called thought sequent. A sequent is an expression of the form Γ → Θ, where Γ and Θ are finite (probably empty) sets of formulae. We use |Γ| to denote the cardinality of Γ. A thought sequent is an expression of the form B e [Γ → Θ] where Γ → Θ is a sequent and e ∈ N <ω . We abbreviate
and {B e (A) : A ∈ Φ} as B e (Φ). For each e = (i 1 , ..., i m ) ∈ N <ω , the interpretation of a thought sequence B e [Γ → Θ] is that player i 1 believes player i 2 believes ... player i m conducts logical reasoning Γ → Θ. In Section 3 we focus on cases with |e| ≤ 1. In Section 5 we will consider more complicated belief hierarchies.
The logical reasoning of the innermost player i m in B e (e = (i 1 , ..., i m )) follows some axiom schemata and inference rules. In Gentzen style formulation of KD-system there is one logical axiom schemata and eleven inference rules as follows.
Logical axiom scheme: B e [A → A],
Structural rules:
Operational rules:
Epistemic distribution rule:
For application in cooperative games, we need the following non-logical axioms which states that the innermost player (i.e., each player) is able to do numerical comparisons.
Non-logical axioms
, if and only if y T ≥ S x U ∈ At 2 and y i < x i for some i ∈ S.
Finally we define the concept of proof, which describes the inference process of a player. Let B e [Γ → Θ] be a thought sequent. A proof of B e [Γ → Θ] is a finite tree satisfying:
P0. Each node of the tree is associated with a thought sequent; P1. The thought sequence associated to each leaf is an instance of a logical axiom or a non-logical axiom;
P2. For each node, the thought sequents associated to it and its predecessors form an instance of an inference rules;
there is a proof of it.
Knowledge for Unanimously Acceptence of Only Core Payoffs
Cooperative game theory is formulated from the viewpoint of the outsider (i.e., a researcher), that is, the player set and the payoffs achievable by each coalition are given. In this paper, we take the viewpoint of an insider (a player). A player has some knowledge about the game situation, e.g., she may know payoffs that can be achieved by herself or through the cooperation with other players, or payoffs of some other coalitions; also, she has some criterion for determining which payoff vectors are acceptable. In this section, we use a thought sequent to describe that a player reasons out whether a payoff vector is acceptable, and study the epistemic structure of a player's decision process for accepting a core-payoff vector. Our main questions are (1) How to formulate a criterion corresponding to the core-payoff vectors?
(2) Given that criterion, how much knowledge is needed for a player to accept core payoffs? (3) Given that all players have that criterion, to achieve that a payoff vector is accepted unanimously if and only if it is in the core, how much knowledge is needed in total and how should the knowledge be distributed among players? Let G = (N, v) with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N . For each i ∈ N and x N ∈ At 1 , consider the following formula:
It means that there does not exist a coalition S including i and a payoff vector y such that y is achievable by coalition S, each player in S at y gets at least as much as she gets at x, and i's payoff is strictly improved from x to y. In other words there is no way to strictly improve player i's payoff at x through cooperation. Hence (2) can be taken as a criterion for player i. For each i ∈ N and x N ∈ At 1 , we use C i (x N ) to denote the formula in (2) . A player's knowledge is described by a set of formulae. Given player i's knowledge Γ i ⊆ P, a payoff vector x is C-acceptable for player i iff
A player's knowledge here is restricted to what can be obtained through collective activities, i.e., she may know v(S) for some S but may not know v(T ) for some T. Formally, for each S ⊆ N,
is interpreted as knowledge about what can be obtained for each coalition S ∈ S i while other payoff vectors are inaccessible. Now we can explore which payoff vector is C-acceptable for each S i ∈ 2 N . The following example gives the intuition. Example 3.1. Consider the 2-person game in Example 1.1, i.e., v({1}) = v({2}) = 10 and v({1, 2}) = 30. The core is {(x, 30 − x) : 10 ≤ x ≤ 20}. Here we take player 1's viewpoint and consider only payoff vectors with integer entries. First, suppose player 1 does not know any coalition's payoff. This can be described by letting S 1 = ∅ (equivalently, Γ 1 (S 1 ) = {¬y S : y S ∈ At 1 }, that is, no payoff vector is known to be accessible to her. This can be interpreted as that, since she does not know any possibility of cooperation, she has no way to achieve any payoff. It can be seen that for any integer vector
The proof is as follows:
Also, since it can be proved that
, it follows by the inference rule (Cut) that
. This result coincides with the intuition that when a player is "helplessly ignorant" and does not know what can be achieved by herself or through cooperation with others, she can only bear any payment offered to her. Now we suppose that player 1 knows v({1}), i.e., how much she can earn by herself. Let S 1 = {{1}}. Her knowledge can be described by Γ 1 (S 1 )(= I({1}) ∪ {¬y S : y S ∈ At 1 − I({1})}). Now some payoff vectors is C-unacceptable. For example, consider x = (9, 21). Since (10, 0) 1 ∈ S 1 , it can be proved that
However, if player 1 only knows v({1}), still she may accept some payoff vectors outsider the core. For example, consider x = (10, 10). It can be seen that x is C-acceptable since for each S 1 and
Actually, x can be rejected by player 1 only if she knows how much can be obtained by cooperating with player 2. Let S 1 = {{1, 2}}. Now her knowledge can be described as Γ 1 (S 1 )(= I({1, 2}) ∪ {¬y S : y S ∈ At 1 − I({1, 2})}). It can be shown in a similar way as (4) that
Yet, even if player 1 knows v({1}) and v({1, 2}), she still accepts some payoff vectors outside the core, for example, x = (30, 0). On the other hand, player 2 would reject x if he knows v({2}). Let S * i = {{i}, {1, 2}} (i = 1, 2). It can be seen that if an integer payoff vector x is in the core, then
From Example 3.1, one may notice some relationship between C-acceptance and knowledge. First, the core payoffs are always C-acceptable regardless of knowledge. This is shown in the following proposition. 
The proof of Proposition 3.1 needs the following lemma. Let Φ be a non-empty set of formulae. We use ¬Φ to denote the set {¬A : A ∈ Φ}. (b) for each y S ∈ At 1 , either y S ∈ Γ i or ¬y S ∈ Γ i but not both.
Proof. Let x ∈ N N . We consider the following two cases:
Case 2. there is some S i and some y ∈ At 1 such that
is a non-logical axiom}. We consider the following subcases:
Case 2.1. If for each y S ∈ D i (x N ), ¬y S ∈ Γ i , then it can be shown in a similar way as in (3) that
it can be shown in a similar way as in case 2.1 that
then it can be shown in a similar way as in in (4) 
] cannot hold simultaneously can be seen clearly from the proof. // Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Hence there is some i ∈ N, T i, and
Consider the formula y T . Since Γ i (S i ) = ∪ S∈S i I(S) ∪ {¬y T : y T ∈ At 1 − ∪ S∈S I(S)}, it follows that y T ∈ I(T ), i.e., Σ j∈T y j ≤ v(T ). Also, B i [→ y T ≥ T x N ] implies that y j ≥ x j for each j ∈ T, and B i [→ y T > i x N ] implies that y i > x i . Hence Σ j∈T x j < Σ j∈T y j ≤ v(T ), and consequently x / ∈ C(G). // Proposition 3.1 states that accepting core-payoff vectors does not need any knowledge. Then the problem is what kind of knowledge leads one to reject payoff vectors outside the core. It can be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that for each player i, her knowledge about any coalition not containing her does not help in making rejection-decision; only the knowledge on coalitions containing her helps. This is shown in the following proposition. Proposition 3.2 (Knowledge about irrelevant coalitions is useless) Let i ∈ N, S i ⊆ 2 N , and T ∈ 2 N − S i with i / ∈ T. Then for each x ∈ N N with Σ i∈N
Proof. We show the If part. The Only-if part can be shown in a similar manner. Suppose that
Hence there is some S ∈ S i ∪ {T } with S i and
. Since S i, S = T, and consequently S ∈ S i , that is, y S is still in Γ i (S i ), and still 
3 is a corollary of Theorem 3.1 in the following, so we omit its proof. It should be noted that this is a decentralization of knowledge in the sense that a player does not need to know all coalitions. On the other hand, when N grows very large, this is demanding on a player's cognitive ability since she has to know 2 |N |−1 coalitions. Hence it is natural to wonder whether each player really needs to know so many coalitions for reaching an agreement only on core-payoff vectors. We have the following theorem, which characterize unanimous acceptance of only core payoffs in terms of the minimal knowledge. Theorem 3.1 (Knowledge for characterizing the core) Let N be a set of players and
Then there is some S ⊆ N (S = ∅) such that Σ i∈S x i < v(S). Let j be a player satisfying that j ∈ S and S ∈ S j . Define y ∈ R N as follows: for each i ∈ N
Since x ∈ N N and v(S) ∈ N, Σ i∈S y i ≤ v(S) and y i × |N | ∈ N for each i ∈ N, that is, y S ∈ I(S). Also, by construction it can be seen that y i ≥ x i for each i ∈ S and y j > x j , that is, B j [→ y S ≥ S x N ] and B j [→ y S > j x N ] are non-logical axioms. Hence it can be shown that
. Hence there is some T i, and
, and
Consider the payoff vector y. Since y T ∈ I(T ), Σ j∈T y j ≤ v(T ); also, B i [→ y T ≥ T x N ] implies that y j ≥ x j for each j ∈ T, and B i [→ y T > i x N ] implies that y i > x i . Hence Σ j∈T x j < Σ j∈T y j ≤ v(T ), and consequently x / ∈ C(G).
(2) Let S ⊆ N with S = ∅ such that S / ∈ S i for each i ∈ N. We define G = (N, v) ∈ G N such that v(N ) = v(S) = |N | and v(T ) = 0 for all other T ⊆ N. We consider the following two cases.
Only players in S may reject x. Let j ∈ S. Since S / ∈ S j , by construction for each
is a non-logical axiom if and only if
Therefore, x is C-acceptable for each i ∈ N. // Theorem 3.1 has two implications. On one hand, it provides insights into the relationship between knowledge and social justice. It has long been an important issue in the literature that lack of information may lead to social injustice (cf. Kegan [27] , Davis and Harrison [15] ). As Charon [13] (p. 112) puts it, "Those who lack knowledge and understanding of the situation in which they act are especially limited in their freedom of thought, and this will have implications for the choices they make for their action." Theorem 3.1 makes this point more specific, showing that the realization of an unjust allocation might originated from the lack of knowledge about the value of some coalitions (because of, say, ignorance, unawareness, or intentional manipulation of information).
On the other hand, it also shows that acheiving social justice is difficult in a society composed by a large population of individuals with bounded cognitive ability. If |N | = n and each individual can know at most k coalitions, Theorem 3.1 requires that 2 n − 1 ≤ kn, i.e., k ≥ (2 n − 1)/n, which implies that a large population requires a high cognitive ability in average, and the requirement grows exponentially when n increases. This gives us a new aspect to re-consider some classical results in the literature. An example will be given in Section 4.
Epistemic Incosistency Behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem
An implication of Theorem 3.1 is that, to reject an allocation outside the core, a coalition which can achieve an allocation dominating it should be known to one member it. Such a coalition can be called effective in filtering out non-core-payoffs. In a game with a large number of players, there may probably exist many effective coalitions, and to know all of them is cognitively demanding. This intuition leads to a reconsideration of some classical results in the literature, for example, Debreu-Scarf [16] 's Theorem from the epistemic perspective.
Debreu-Scarf Theorem states that, when the number of participants in a replica economy increases unboundedly, the core of the economy converges to the set of competitive equilibria. In this section, we use an example to show that there is an epistemic inconsistency behind the convergence. That is, as the number of participants in a replica economy increases, at least one player has to have unbounded cognitive ability to filter out the non-core-payoffs, while competitive equilibria, regardless of the population, always requires an unvaried cognitive ability for each player, that is, the ability of knowing the prices and her own preferences.
For simplicity, here we focus on pure exchange economy. A pure exchange economy is a tuple E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ), where N is the set of participants of the economy, M is the set of commodities, e i ∈ R M + is the endowment bundle of commodities and u i is a utility function on R M of participant i ∈ N. In the following, we consider the simplest pure exchange economy, called Edgeworth economy, where N = {1, 2} and M = {1, 2}. We adopt the model in Shapley [43] and assume that E satisfies the following conditions:
E1. e 1 = (1, 0) and e 2 = (0, 1); E2. u i is identical for each i ∈ N, i.e., there is some u such that u i = u for each i ∈ N ; E3. u is continuous, increasing, strictly concave, and homothetic (i.e., there is an increasing function f such that f (u(x 1 , x 2 )) is positively homogeneous of degree 1).
A competitive equilibrium of E is a pair (p, (x i ) i∈N ) where p ∈ R M and x i ∈ R M for each i ∈ N satisfying the following two conditions:
A vector (x i ) i∈N is called an equilibrium allocation of E iff there is some p ∈ R M such that (p, (x i ) i∈N ) is a competitive equilibrium of E.
Given E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ), we can define a game G(E) = (N, v) from E by letting that for each S ⊆ N, v(S) = max Σ i∈S x i =Σ i∈S e i Σ i∈S u i (x i ). The difference is, as noted in Shapley [43] (p.346, footnote 6), that the game defined in Section 2 discusses vectors of utilities while an economy discusses vectors of allocations. Nevertheless, they are structurally equivalent. Let E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ) be a Edgeworth economy, S ⊆ N, and x = (x i ) i∈N , y = (y i ) i∈N be two vectors such that x i , y i ∈ R M for each i ∈ N. We say that y dominates x via S, denoted by y dom S x, iff the following two conditions hold:
The core of E, denoted by C(E), is the set {(x i ) i∈N : x i ∈ R M for each i ∈ N, Σ i∈N x i = Σ i∈N e i , and there is no S ⊆ N and (y i ) i∈N with Σ i∈N y i ≤ Σ i∈N e i such that y dom S x}.
.., k} and each participant (i, t) ∈ N k has the endowment bundle e i and utility function u i . Now each i ∈ N is called a type of the economy.
Given an Edgeworth economy, it can be shown that its equilibria allocation are in the core. But the core also contains other allocations. By Debreu-Scarf Theorem, when the number of replicas increases unboundedly, the core of an Edgeworth economy satisfying E1-E3 converges to the set of its equilibrium allocations (see Shapley [43] ).
In the following, we use the logic system developed in Sections 2 and 3 to analyze the change of players' knowledge as the number of replicas increases. To make the analysis non-trivial, we enlarge the formal language defined in Section 2.2. Let E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ) be an Edgeworth economy. The set of atomic formulae At = At 1 ∪ At 2 , where
Note that we now extend At 1 to include the vectors with rational entries. We adopt the following non-logical axioms:
The non-logical axioms here requires that a player knows every other player's utility function. In general, this is much more demanding than the requirement in Section 2, where only the numerical comparing ability is required. Nevertheless, since we have adopted Assumption E2, i.e., players' utilities are identical, the non-logical axioms here only mean that each player has the ability of reflection.
The 1-fold replica E 1 of an Edgeworth economy E satisfying E1-E3 can be illustrated by the Edgeworth Box in Figure 4 .1. As shown in Shapley [43] , the core of E 1 is the segment of diagonal between f and g (called the contract curve). First, as shown in Example 3.1, if a player neither knows her endowment or the possibility of cooperation with the other player, then any allocation is C-acceptable for her. However, this epistemic situation seems artificial here because, in an exchanges economy, each participant exchanges her endowments for some other bundle of commodities. Therefore, at least it should be assumed that each participant i knows her endowment e i and consequently u i (e i ).
The knowledge of i's endowment can be represented here by a finite subset of At 1 containing formulas in the form of (e i ; x) {i} . Consider one of such set I({i}) = {(e 1 , e 2 ) {i} }. It is easy to see that i would reject any allocation x represented by a point under (but not on) i's indifference curve through e. Formally, since B i [→ (e 1 , e 2 ) {i} > i x N ] is a non-logical axiom, it is easy to see
On the other hand, for an allocation x represented by a point on or above i's indifference curve through e, it is impossible to prove either
Some of those allocations can be eliminated if player i knows what can be obtained if she cooperates (i.e., exchange) with the other participant. The ideal situations is that i knows every point on or above her indifferent curve through e. Then every point in the lens between i's and j's indifference curves through e except segment f g can be rejected. However, due to the finistic character of formal languages, i's knowledge can only be described by a finite set of formulae. Hence no matter how many formulae each player knows, still there is some allocation outside the core (the segment f g in E 1 ) that is unanimously C-acceptable. However, from the negative side we can show that, for each allocation x = (x i ) i∈N with Σ i∈N x i = Σ i∈N e i outsider the core, there are (Γ i ) i∈N satisfying that for each i ∈ N,
(1) Γ i is finite; (2) (e i , y) {i} ∈ Γ i for some y;
z is an allocation on or above i's indifference curve through e};
] holds for at least one i ∈ N. Here, each Γ i can be seen as a "partial" knowledge about the cooperation between 1 and 2. Though there is no single partial knowledge pair can help players to reject all payoff vectors outside the core, every such vector can be rejected based on some partial knowledge.
On the other hand, for each allocation y on the segment f g, there is no (Γ i ) i∈N satisfying conditions (1) - (3) 
As the number of replica grows, more points on the f g segment will be eliminate and the two "frontiers" will be closer and closer. To describe this process as rejections of more points on f g segment, we extend the argument above and have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Each non-core-payoff is rejected based on some partial knowledge). Let E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , { i } i∈N ) be an Edgeworth economy satisfying E1-E3 and k ∈ N + . Consider the k-th replica
Proof. For each x / ∈ C(E k ), there is some y and T ⊆ N k such that y T ∈ At 1 , Σ σ∈T y σ ≤ Σ σ∈T e σ (i.e., y T ∈ I(T )), and y dom T x. Then for any σ ∈ T with y σ > x σ and any finite Γ σ ⊆ ∪ S σ I(S) with y T ∈ Γ σ , it can be seen that B σ [Γ σ → ¬C σ (x N )] holds. // Proposition 4.1 states that, even if in a finite formal language we could not reject all non-core payoffs based on any finite "partial" knowledge, every non-core-payoff can be eliminated by some finite knowledge. Now our problem is how the knowledge to reject non-core-payoffs grows when the number of replica grows. Here we need to know what are the effective coalitions in each E k for the rejections. For example, consider the 2-fold replica E 2 of E. First, we show that for an allocation x, if players of the same type get the same payoff at x, then x would be blocked. Consider an allocation x with x (1,1) = x (1,2) and x (1,2) 1 x (1, 1) . Without loss of generality, we assume that x (2,2) 2 x (2,1) . Now consider an allocation y with y (i,1) = 0.5x (i,1) + 0.5x (i,2) for i = 1, 2. Since i is strongly convex, y (1,1) 1 x (1,1) and y (2,1) 2 x (2,1) . Further, y (1,1) + y (2,1) = 0.5Σ 2 i=1 (x (i,1) + x (i,2) ) = e 1 + e 2 . It follows that y dom {(1,1),(2,1)} x and y (1,1) 1 x (1,1) . In formal language, for any finite Γ (1, 1) containing y {(1,1),(2,1)} , B (1, 1) [Γ (1, 1) → ¬C (1, 1) (x N ) ]. This results implies that for E 2 , we need only consider those allocations satisfying equal treatment property, i.e., players of the same type get the same payoffs. Therefore, still we can focus on the contract curve in the Edgeworth Box in Figure 4 .1. Also, it means that for each i = 1, 2, {(i, 1), (i, 2)} is effective and should be known to some member of it.
On the other hand, now some allocations on the contract curve between f and g becomes Cunacceptable. As an example, consider the allocation represented by f in Figure 4 .1. Indeed, the allocation that gives f i to each player with type i (i = 1, 2) is blocked by S = { (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1) }. Consider the point h which is the middle point on the line connecting f and e and an allocation (h 1 , h 1 , f 2 ) among members in S. Since both f and e are allocations with quantities of rational number, so is h. Since the preference relation 1 is strongly convex and
and f 1 + f 2 = e 1 + e 2 , it follows that h 1 + h 1 + f 2 = 2e 2 + e 2 , that is, h 1 for (1, 1) and (1, 2) and f 2 for (2, 1) is accessible within S. Here we have shown that the allocation (
Actually, each allocation x on the f g segment which is strictly less preferred by i to the allocation represented by the middle point y on the line connecting x and e are dominated by y via coalition {(i, 1), (i, 2), (j, 1)}. It can be shown that there is finite sets (Γ σ ) σ∈N 2 satisfying conditions similar to (1) 
Let us summarize the observations above. In E 1 , every non-empty subset of N needs to be known to someone contained in it, that is,
In E 2 , the following coalitions need to be known:
{(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}.
Other coalitions are unnecessarily to be known since the role they played in blocking can be substituted by coalitions in the list. For example, the role of {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)} is completely the same as {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}. Nevertheless, the important thing is that, as the number of replica increases to 2, some "new coalitions" are needed to be known to reject non-core-payoffs; especially, to reject "more" payoff vectors (i.e, some points on segment f g), knowledge about more coalitions is necessary; without them, allocations which are in C(E 1 ) but not the competitive equilibrium cannot be gradually rejected as the number of replica increases. This is summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 4.2 (More coalitions for more non-core-payoffs). Let E = (N, M, {e i } i∈N , { i } i∈N ) be a Edgeworth economy and k ∈ N + with k > 1. There is some
Now we show that the necessary knowledge increases faster than the number of replica does. As noted in Shapley [43] , in general, in the k-replica E k of E (k > 1), the following coalitions are effective: (1, 1), ..., (1, n), (2, 1) , ..., (2, n − 1)}, { (1, 1), ..., (1, n − 1), (2, 1) , ..., (2, n)} for n = 2, ..., k, ; (4) N k . And it is easy to see that, for each k ∈ N with k > 2, in additions to coalitions needed to be known in E k−1 (except N k−1 ), E k needs to know further (1) {(i, k)} for i = 1, 2; (2) {(i, k), (j, m)} for m = 1, ..., k and i = j; (3) { (1, 1) , ..., (1, k), (2, 1) , ..., (2, k − 1)}, { (1, 1) , ..., (1, k − 1), (2, 1) , ..., (2, k)}; (4) N k . Then it is easy to see that for the k-replica E k , k > 2, the number of effective coalitions is k 2 +4k−1, and the average number of coalitions a participator needs to know is
. This implies that to reject non-equilibrium allocations, as the number of replica infinitely increases, the knowledge needed to be known also increases, and for each n ∈ N, there is some k(n) ∈ N such that some player in E k(n) needs to know more than n coalitions.
In contrast, in the competitive market, each participant needs only to know her own preferences and the price. This knowledge does not change as the number of replica grows. Further, as each participator has the same preferences, the knowledge is also symmetric. This is epistemic inconsistency behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem: the increase of the number of replicas, on one hand, has constant requirement on each participator's knowledge in the competitive market, while, on the other hand, requires unbounded epistemic ability for at least one player in the cooperative situation.
Concluding Remarks
5.1. Balanced sets, knowledge, and acceptance of core payoffs Theorem 3.1 (1) implies that, if each coalition is known by some player in it, then an empty core (no integer core-payoff vector) implies that there is no integer payoff accessible in v(N ) that is unanimously accepted. From the viewpoint of computation, that may lead to a decentralized approach to determine whether the core is empty. Then it is natural to wonder whether this determination can be down based on lesser knowledge. This problem can be approached by using balancedness.
Given the player set N, a family B of coalitions of N (i.e., B ⊆ 2 N ) is called balanced iff there is {λ S } S∈B with λ S ∈ [0, 1] for each S ∈ B satisfying that for each i ∈ N, Σ S i λ S = 1. {λ S } S∈B is called balanced weights of B. In the following, when we consider player i's knowledge, we mean a set Γ i = Γ i (S i ) for some S i ⊆ {S ⊆ N : S i}. Given such a Γ i , we denote the family of coalitions i knows, that is, S i , by S(Γ i ). Given a family B of coalitions of N, we define K(B) = {(Γ i ) i∈N : ∪ i∈N S(Γ i ) = B}.
We have the following statement, whish states whether the core is empty can be determined based on the balanced families of coalitions. To show it, we need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in, e.g., Kannai [26] . Proof of Proposition 5.1. Suppose that C(G) = ∅. By Lemma 5.1, there is some some balanced family B of coalitions of N with balanced weights {λ S } S∈B such that Σ S∈B λ S v(S) > v(N ). Let (Γ i ) i∈N ∈ K(B). Suppose there is some x ∈ ∩ i∈N {x ∈ N N : Σ i∈N x i ≤ v(N ) and B i [Γ i → C i (x N )]}. It follows that Σ i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ B. Then Σ i∈N x i = Σ S∈B λ S (Σ i∈S x i ) ≥ Σ S∈B λ S v(S) > v(N ), which is a contradiction. // Proposition 5.1 provides a method to determine whether C(G) is empty. However, it needs to check every balanced family B of coalitions and every (Γ i ) i∈N ∈ K(B), which requires an enormous amount of computation as |N | grows. Further, the computation would be more troublesome if we consider the computation of all balanced families (see Peleg [32] ). It is wondered whether there is simpler ways to do it. More researches are expected in this direction.
Alternative definitions of knowledge and criteria
In Section 3, we defined the knowledge about a family of coalitions S as Γ(S) = ∪ S∈S I(S)∪{¬y S : y S / ∈ ∪ S∈S I(S)}. An alternative is to let Γ = ∪ S∈S I(S). However, it should be noted that under this definition, Lemma 3.1 does not hold, and we should show that for some x, neither B i [Γ → C(x)] and B i [Γ → ¬C(x)] are unprovable. It is also possible to define knowledge of coalitions in other ways.
Another problem is the definition of C-acceptability. Here we did not include hierarchical belief structure in the formula (2) . That is, we did not require that for example, a player believes that all other players in any coalition she knows also have knowledge about that coalition. In this sense, C-acceptability may be regarded as a "naïve" criterion. It is possible to include interpersonal inferences and construct a more sophisticated criterion. For example, consider the formula
It requires that not only a y S is known to player i herself but also to all players in S. If (9) is adopted as the criterion, then knowledge/belief about other players' knowledge/belief is also needed for each player. How to define a player's criterion on her belief about others' knowledge/choice will play a critical role in studying concepts like Vohra [47] 's enforcement of contracts and incentive compatibility constraints. Further research can be done on formulating the decision criterion for some solution concepts in the literature of cooperative games/competitive markets/matchings with incomplete information, for example, the coarse core in Wilson [49] and the interim core in Schipper [40] . Schipper [40] 's Bayesian cooperative game can be described by a KD45 Kripke model. The syntactic part may need an extension of the system in this paper to incorporate common knowledge, for example, by the fixed-point approach in Halpern and Moses [22] . Another direction is to study the epistemic structure of dynamic coalition formation processes, for example, what is the logic correspondence of the forward-induction reasoning in matching (Pomatto [36] , Liu et al. [28] ). It is wondered whether we can construct a parallel to the dynamic logic model in Bonnano [8] , [9] to capture some classic epistemic criteria by Battigalli [3] , Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4] , Perea [35] , among others, in cooperative game theory.
